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Abstract
In this report we provide an overview of digital reputation management systems
for virtual communities. We begin with a discussion on the how trust is created in
the real world. We then highlight how the process of trust creation differs in the
virtual world. Next, we talk about the different ways in which digital reputations are
useful to virtual communities such as incentivizing cooperation and punishing ma-
licious users, providing recommendations or as a form of distributed authentication.
We then discuss how evolutionary biology and game theory have informed research
in reputation systems. This is followed by a discussion of the various components
of reputation such as context, the forms of evidence, first and second order repu-
tation and architectural considerations including the role of distributed hash tables
in decentralized reputation management systems. We conclude with a discussion of
some reputation management systems such as complaints-based trust, EigenTrust,
PeerTrust and ROCQ.
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1 Introduction
A virtual community can be defined as a group of people sharing a common interest
or goal who interact over a virtual medium, most commonly the Internet. Virtual com-
munities are characterized by an absence of face-to-face interaction between participants
which makes the task of measuring the trustworthiness of other participants harder than in
non-virtual communities. This is due to the anonymity that the Internet provides, coupled
with the loss of audiovisual cues that help in the establishment of trust. As a result, dig-
ital reputation management systems are an invaluable tool for measuring trust in virtual
communities.
Trust is an important component of all human interactions whether they take place online
or not. There is an implicit assumption of trust in each interaction that we participate in
that involves some investment on our part. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines trust
as assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something.
Even more pertinent to virtual communities is an alternative definition which states that
trust is a dependence on something future or contingent; reliance on future payment for
property (as merchandise) delivered. These definitions illustrate that the basis of trust is
an expectation of future payment or reward and that the transaction partner will behave in
an honest fashion and fulfill their obligations.
The processes behind the creation of trust can be classified in four broad categories:
1. Personality-based Trust: a person’s innate disposition to trust others.
2. Cognitive Trust: through recognition of the characteristics of the transaction part-
ner.
3. Institution-based Trust: a buyer’s perception that effective (third-party) institu-
tional mechanisms are in place to facilitate transaction success [49].
4. Transaction-based Trust: that relies on a participant’s past behavior to assess their
trustworthiness.
Personality-based trust does not have a significant use in virtual communities where de-
cisions on trust are made algorithmically. Most cognitive factors that form trust in real-
life interactions such as the manner of a person, their body language and the intonations
of their speech are also absent in virtual communities. However, there are alternative
forms of cognition that can be used instead. These are almost invariably based on the
virtual identity of the community member. In most purely online contexts - as opposed
to contexts where the online identity is linked to a non-online identity such as with on-
line banking - there are virtually no costs to creating a new virtual identity. Obtaining
an email address on any of the free web-based email services such as Yahoo, Hotmail,
Gmail is trivial and with each one comes a new virtual identity. While these services
are increasingly adopting strategies such as requiring image reading to counter automated
registration spam programs, it is not difficult to create say a dozen accounts in 10 minutes.
And as the e-Bay scam case [33] showed, that is all a malicious user needs to surmount
simple feedback systems and commit online fraud.
Enforcing trust in virtual communities is hard not only because of the difficulties in recog-
nizing the trustworthiness of participants but also because of the lack of adequate monitor-
ing and appropriate sanctions for dishonest behavior. This lack of institution-based trust
is because there are not enough trusted third-parties with the power to punish in order to
ensure honesty of all the players [4]. This problem is exacerbated in decentralized virtual
communities and electronic marketplaces. An organization like e-Bay with a centralized
infrastructure can act as the trusted third party to at least store feedback information in
a reliable fashion even though the information itself may not be reliable. The problem
becomes much harder with decentralized systems such as peer-to-peer networks where
the absence of a centralized authority is a defining feature of the system.
Hence, it appears that the best strategy for creating trust in virtual communities is through
transaction-based trust where feedback on participants’ past behavior is collected and
aggregated to decide their trustworthiness. A transaction-based trust strategy is far from
perfect and suffers from many of the same shortcomings as the other strategies. For in-
stance, the lack of verifiable identities [18] can make a transaction-based system vulnera-
ble to manipulation. However, as many recent proposals have shown [1,11,15,23,32,46]
such strategies are not contingent upon a trusted third party and the community as a whole
provides the institutional basis for trust. Hence, if the problem of identity can be solved,
transaction-based systems are capable of providing the solution for virtual communities.
Transaction-based trust creation strategies are also commonly known as reputation-based
trust management systems or just reputation systems. Some authors use the term repu-
tation systems narrowly to include only those systems that monitor past transactions of
participants to compute their trustworthiness. This information is then shared with other
participants who decide whether or not to interact with the target participant on its ba-
sis. We use the term in a more general sense to include recommendations systems that
recommend items as well as systems that perform distributed authentication by inferring
trustworthiness. All these systems have one feature in common. The collection and ag-
gregation of feedback in order to rate objects or people.
Before proceeding further, we would like make a quick note on terminology. The decision-
making participants of a virtual community have been referred to in the research literature
by many names. These include “individual” or “user” which usually refer to a real per-
son, “agent” that refers to an automated program that decides on the basis of some rules
and “peer”, “player” and “actor”, that may refer to both a person and a program etc. In
this chapter, we shall use these terms interchangeably as our primary interest is in the
decision-making unit and not whether it is human or machine. However, where neces-
sary, we shall specify if the unit being referred to must necessarily be a human being or
an automated entity. Research in digital reputation also owes a lot to economics. Hence
the terms “game” for the interactions of the virtual community and “co-operation” and
“defection” for behaving honestly and cheating are also commonly used in literature.
Reputation systems research lies at the intersection of several disciplines including evolu-
tionary biology [19,24,45], economics (game theory and mechanism design) [3,6,29,34],
sociology (social network theory [5,31,40]) and computer science (e-commerce, peer-to-
peer systems, cryptography etc.). In this chapter, we survey the approaches taken by re-
searchers from these disciplines to provide the context for digital reputation schemes. We
begin by listing the various applications of digital reputation systems. This is followed
by a discussion of what motivates the participants of a virtual community to cooperate
with each other. We then look at what are the requirements of a good reputation system.
This is followed by a more detailed analysis of the components of reputation systems.
We classify different types of feedback and their role in constructing reputations. We
discuss second-order reputation and the motivations for providing feedback. Reputation
modifying factors such as transaction context are looked at next followed by a discussion
on how reputations can be interpreted. We conclude by looking at several specific digital
reputation systems that have been proposed.
2 Applications of Reputation Management
The main uses of digital reputation management systems in virtual communities:
1. Incentivizing cooperation
2. Identifying and excluding malicious entities
3. Authenticating users in a distributed manner
4. Providing recommendations
Resnick [39] further defines three requirements for a reputation system: 1) to help people
decide whom to trust, 2) to encourage trustworthy behavior and appropriate effort and 3)
to deter participation by those who are unskilled or dishonest. To this we can add the
requirements that a reputation system 4) must preserve anonymity associating a peer’s
reputation with an opaque identifier and 5) have minimal overhead in terms of computa-
tion, storage and infrastructure.
The participation of an individual in a virtual community strongly depends on whether,
and how much benefit they expect to derive from their participation. If an individual
feels that they will not gain anything from joining the community they are unlikely to
participate. Hence, a good distributed system must be designed such that it incentivizes
cooperation by making it profitable for users to participate and withhold services from
users that do not contribute their resources to the system.
An equally serious challenge to distributed systems and virtual communities comes from
users who act in a malicious fashion with the intention of disrupting the system. Ex-
amples of such malicious behavior include users who pollute a file-sharing system with
mislabeled or corrupted content, nodes that disrupt a peer-to-peer (P2P) routing system to
take control of the network, nodes of a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) that misroute
packets from other nodes [11] and even spammers [9] who are maliciously attacking the
email community. Therefore, a central objective of all digital reputation schemes is to
identify such users and punish them or exclude them from the community. This exclusion
is usually achieved by allowing members to distinguish between trustworthy and untrust-
worthy members. An untrustworthy member will not be chosen for future interactions.
In contrast with incentivizing cooperation that motivates truth from participants, this is
based on punishing falsehoods.
Another use for digital reputation systems is for distributed authentication. Distributed
authentication does not rely on strict hierarchies of trust such as those using certification
authorities and a centralized public key infrastructure that underpin conventional authen-
tication. Such networks capture trust relationships between entities. Trust is then propa-
gated in the network so that the trust relationship between any two entities in the network
can be inferred. PGP [48], GnuPGP and OpenPGP-compatible [13] systems all use webs
of trust for authentication. Closely related are virtual social networks including the Friend
of a Friend (FOAF) system, LinkedIn, Tribe.net, Orkut, and Friendster that use some or
the other form of trust propagation.
Recommendation systems are another application that relies on similar principles as dig-
ital reputation systems. Instead of computing the trustworthiness of a participant, rec-
ommendation systems compute the recommendation score of objects based on the col-
lective feedback from other users. These systems are in widespread commercial use and
examples include the Amazon recommendation system and the IMDB movie recommen-
dations. In recommendation systems, objects instead of members of a virtual community
are rated. The members may then be rated on the quality of feedback they provide just
like in reputation systems.
When the number of objects to be rated is usually large compared to the user-base, the
collected data can be very sparse. Collaborative-filtering based recommendation systems
use the collective feedback to try to compute the similarity in the ratings made by any
two users and using this similarity to weigh the rating of one user when predicting the
corresponding choice for the other user. There are many ways in which this similarity can
be computed. One method uses the Pearson’s correlation coefficient [38]:
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where   computes the similarity between users  and ! on the basis of their votes for
all objects " that both have voted for and


 and


 denote respectively the average ratings
given by users  and ! .
Another method is to use vector similarity [10]:
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is the rating given by user  for object " as before and .  is the set of objects for
which user  has a rating. Other model-based methods exist that use Bayesian network
models or clustering models to group users together and use group membership to predict
what a user may vote for a given object. Clustering models have also been shown to be
useful in reputation systems for eliminating spurious ratings [16] made by malicious users
in an electronic marketplace.
3 Motivating Cooperation
Motivating co-operation among participants has been a subject of research since long
before the first virtual communities were formed. As long as there are shared resources,
there will be users who are tempted to use more than their fair share for their own benefit
even if it is at the expense of the community as a whole. This conflict between individual
interests and the common good is exemplified in the “tragedy of the commons” a term
coined by Hardin [28] who used the overgrazing of the English “commons” (property that
was shared by the peasants of a village) as an example. In reputation systems research
such selfish users are termed as free-riders or free-loaders.
An example of free-riding can be found in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). MANETs
function on the premise that nodes will forward packets for each other even though for-
warding a packet consumes power. However, if there are free-riders that inject their own
packets in the network but do not forward any packets from other nodes, they can exploit
the cooperative nature of other users.
Another example of free-riding in virtual communities is found in early file-sharing sys-
tems where an individual is allowed to download files without being required to contribute
any files for uploading. In their measurement study of Napster and Gnutella, Sariou et
al. [43] reported that this resulted in significant fractions of the population indulging in
client-like behavior. They reported that a vast majority of modem users were free-riders
who did not share any files and only downloaded files offered by others. However, equally
interesting is the fact that many users with high bandwidth connections indulged in server-
like behavior and offered their own files for sharing but did not download any files at all.
This unselfish behavior is the flip-side of free-riding where users in a virtual community
indulge in altruism.
Altruism has been studied by evolutionary biologists [19, 24, 45] in humans and other
primates. These authors have sought to explain altruistic behavior by arguing that it sig-
nals “evolutionary fitness”. By behaving generously an individual signals that they have
“plenty to spare” and is thus a good mating choice. In the context of virtual communi-
ties, altruistic behavior is motivated in part by a desire to signal that interacting with the
individual is likely to be beneficial in other contexts as well.
Another strand of research comes from economists who have studied co-operation by
setting up non-zero sum games and determining the equilibria that result both through
analytic game theory and through simulation. In game theory, it is usually assumed that
players are “rational” or “selfish”, i.e., they are only interested in maximizing the benefit
they obtain with no regard to the overall welfare of the community. This is distinct from
an “irrational” player whose utility function depends on something more than just their
own benefit and whose behavior cannot be predicted. An example of irrational players
are “malicious” players who actively wish to harm other players or the game as a whole
even if it means reducing their own personal benefit.
The “game” that is typically used for modeling the problem of cooperation is the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma [21, 26]. The classic prisoner’s dilemma concerns two suspects who are
questioned separately by the police and given a chance to testify against the other. If only
one prisoner betrays the other, the betrayer goes free while the loyal prisoner gets a long
sentence. If both betray each other they get a medium sentence and if both stay silent they
get a small sentence. Hence, if both prisoner’s are “selfish” and have no regard for the
other prisoner, we see the best strategy for a prisoner is always to betray the second pris-
oner, regardless of what the other prisoner chooses. If the second prisoner confesses, the
first prisoner must confess too otherwise the first prisoner will get a long sentence. And
if the second prisoner does not confess, the first prisoner can get off free by confessing as
opposed to getting a short sentence by not confessing.
If the game is played only once, the solution is obvious. “Always Defect” is the domi-
nant strategy1. Axelrod [6] studied an interesting extension to the classic problem which
he called the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Here, members of a community play against
each other repeatedly and retain memory of their past interactions. Hence, they have an
opportunity to punish players for their past defections. Axelrod set up an experiment
with various strategies submitted by fellow researchers playing against each other. He
discovered that “greedy” strategies tended to do very poorly in the long run and were out-
performed by more ”altruistic” strategies, as judged by pure self-interest. This was true
as long as cheating was not tolerated indefinitely. By analyzing the top-scoring strategies,
Axelrod stated several conditions necessary for a strategy to be successful. A successful
strategy should be 1) Nice: it will not defect before an opponent does. 2) Retaliating: it
1A dominant strategy always give better payoff than another strategy regardless of what other players
are doing.
will always retaliate when cheated. A blind optimist strategy like “Always Cooperate”
does not do well. 3) Forgiving: in order to stop endless cycles of revenge and counter-
revenge a strategy will start cooperating if an opponent stops cheating. 4) Non-envious:
a strategy will not try to outscore an opponent. Axelrod found that the best deterministic
strategy was “tit-for-tat” in which a player behaved with its partner in the same way as
the partner had behaved in the previous round.
The prisoner’s dilemma is a game with a specific reward function that encourages altru-
istic behavior and discourages selfish behavior. Let / be the temptation to defect, 0 be
the reward for mutual cooperation, 1 be the Punishment for mutual defection and 2 be
the Sucker’s punishment for cooperating while the other defects. Then, the following
inequality must hold:
/435063716372 (3)
In the iterated game, yet another inequality must hold:
/9852;:=<>0 (4)
If this is not the case, then two players will gain more in the long run if one cooperates
and the other defects alternately rather than when both cooperate. Hence, there will be
no incentive for mutual cooperation. Recall that the objective of a rational player is to
maximize their individual score and not score more than the opponent.
Other virtual communities may have different cost and reward functions. The game-
theoretic approach is to devise strategies to maximize individual utility in a fixed game.
However, if a community is designed so that its interests as a whole are not aligned with
those of an individual, the system is will be “gamed” by the rational users leading to the
ultimate failure of the virtual community. Mechanism design [29] deals with the design of
systems such that players’ selfish behavior results in the desired system-wide goals. This
is achieved by constructing cost and reward functions that encourage “correct” behavior.
Another example of incentivizing cooperation can be found in collaborative content dis-
tribution mechanisms [2,8,12] such as BitTorrent [14] where peers cooperate to download
a file from a server by downloading different chunks in parallel and then exchanging them
with each other to reconstruct the entire file. In fact, BitTorrent implements a “tit-for-tat”
strategy to prevent free-riding. Basic reputation schemes have also been implemented in
second generation file-sharing systems such as Kazaa that measure the participation level
of a peer based on the number of files the peer has uploaded and downloaded. Peers with
a higher participation level are given preference when downloading a file from the same
source.
4 Design Requirements for a Reputation System
While mechanism design may help achieve overall system goals through proper incen-
tivization, it is ineffective against deliberately malicious (or irrational) participants. To
solve this problem a number of reputation systems have emerged. These operate by al-
lowing a user to rate the transactions they have had with other users. This feedback
is collected and aggregated to form a reputation value which denotes the trustworthi-
ness of a user. This reputation information is made available to requesting users who
then make their decisions on whether or not to interact with a given user based on its
reputation. Several competing schemes for aggregating this feedback have been pro-
posed [1, 15, 17, 23, 32, 46, 47].
The architectural and implementation details of the aggregation mechanism depend on
the underlying network on which the virtual community is based. When the community
is built on top of a traditional client-server network, a trusted third party exists which
can be relied on to collect and aggregate opinions to form a global view. e-Bay feed-
back, Amazon customer review and the Slashdot distributed moderation systems are all
examples where feedback from users is stored in a centralized trust database. The aggre-
gation is performed in this centralized database and all users have access to the global
reputations thus computed. When the community is built on top of a P2P network, the
challenges of managing feedback become much harder. There is no centralized, trusted,
reliable, always-on database and the collection, storage, aggregation and dispersal of trust
information must be done in a distributed way. Relying on third parties for storage and
dissemination also makes the system vulnerable to tampering and falsification of trust
information in storage and transit. Moreover, the system must also provide redundancy
because users may drop out of the network at any time.
Hence, there are two separate but interrelated challenges that must be overcome by any
distributed trust management system. The first is the choice of an appropriate trust metric
that accurately reflects the trustworthiness of users and is resistant to tampering and other
attacks. This was recognized by Aberer and Despotovic as “the semantic question: which
is the model that allows us to assess trust [of an agent based on that agents behavior and
the global behavior standards]” [1]. The second is designing a system architecture that is
robust against the challenges mentioned above or the “data management” problem.
At this point, it is useful to ask why a reputation system would work in a virtual com-
munity and what may cause it to fail. The reasons for potential success are: 1) The costs
of providing and distributing reputations are negligible or zero. 2) The infrastructure for
decentralized aggregation and dissemination already exists in the form DHT-based2 rout-
ing systems [37, 44]. 3) It is easy to build redundancy in the reputation system. And the
potential failings are: 1) Users may lie about the feedback they provide. 2) Users may
not bother to give feedback. 3) Untrustworthy users may mask their behavior or retaliate
against negative feedback by sending negative feedback about other users. 4) Users may
try to game the system by building up their reputation by acting honestly over several
small transactions followed by cheating in a large transaction in a process known as milk-
ing. 5) Users may form malicious groups that give false positive ratings to each other in
order to boost each others reputations. 6) Users may re-enter the system with a new iden-
tity to conceal their past behavior. Hence, a good reputation system must try to overcome
these potential failings.
2In systems using distributed hash tables or DHTs, objects are associated with a key (usually produced
by hashing the object ID such as filename) and each node in the system is responsible for all objects
associated with a key that falls in a certain range.
5 Analysis of Reputation System Components
5.1 Direct vs. Indirect Evidence
Two distinct types of evidence are usually combined by reputation systems to form the
reputation of a user. These are 1) direct evidence, which consists of a user’s first-hand
experiences of another user’s behavior and 2) indirect evidence which is second-hand
information that is received from other nodes about their own experiences. If only first-
hand information were used to decide the reputation of another peer, the sparseness of
feedback would be a problem because in large virtual communities the interaction matrix
is usually very sparse. A user would not be able to make a trust judgment on another user
with whom they have never interacted before. Hence, users must rely on indirect evidence
to compute the reputation of users that are new to them.
In a centralized system such as e-Bay all indirect evidence is collected at the central
trust database and is made available to other users. In a decentralized system indirect
evidence can be shared in a number of ways. The interested user may ask for indirect
evidence from its neighbors or other users it trusts as in [15]. The indirect evidence
may also be propagated to all users in the network using a recursive mechanism like
in [32]. Designated Agents3 may also be chosen from within the community to store
indirect evidence which can then be furnished to requesting users [1, 23, 46]. In the latter
schemes, designated agents responsible for specific users in the system are chosen using
distributed hash tables. Multiple such agents are chosen to ensure redundancy in case an
agent leaves the network or tries to falsify this information.
5.2 Second-Order Reputation
Using second-hand information in a decentralized system leads to another problem. How
can a user know that the provider of the second-hand information is telling the truth?
3The term Designated Agents was coined by the authors and includes all systems where one or more
users are made responsible for storing and sharing another user’s reputation information by the system.
We can think of an individual’s reputation for providing accurate reputation information
on other as their second-order reputation information. Second-order reputation is often
termed as credibility as it measures the truthfulness of an individual as a provider of
information.
The problem was first addressed by Aberer and Despotovic [1] who were among the first
to use a decentralized reputation storage system. They use the trustworthiness of an agent
(first-order reputation), to decide whether to take its feedback into account. The feedback
from agents who are deemed trustworthy are included and that from untrustworthy agents
is excluded. Kamvar et al. [32] also use the same strategy of using first-order reputation
as second-order reputation as well. However, while it is reasonable to assume that an
individual who cheats in the main market cannot be relied upon for accurate feedback,
the reverse is not necessarily true. An individual can act honestly in the main market and
enjoy a high reputation and at the same time provide false feedback to lower the reputation
of others in the community who are after all his/her competitors. An example where such
a strategy would be advantageous is a hotel rating system where a hotel may provide very
good service and thus have a high reputation but at the same time may give false feedback
about its competitors to lower their reputation. Hence its credibility is very different from
its reputation.
The solution is to recognize credibility as different from first-order reputation and com-
pute it separately. Credibility can be computed in several different ways. Credibility val-
ues can be expressed explicitly and solicited separately from reputation values. However
this leads to a problem of endless recursion. To ensure that users do not lie about other
users credibility, we need third-order reputation to measure an individual’s reputation for
providing accurate credibility information and so on.
Credibility can also be computed implicitly. This can be done in two ways. In the first
method, inspired by collaborative filtering, the similarity of user " ’s opinions to those
of user ! are used to compute the credibility of user " in the eyes of user ! ( ? 

). This
can be done using Pearson’s correlation coefficients as used by Resnick et al. [38] or by
using vector similarity like in Breese et al. [10]. PeerTrust [46] uses yet another similarity
metric that resembles the Pearson coefficient. In this method if user ! ’s opinions are often
at variance with those of user " , ! will have a lower credibility value for " and vice versa.
The second approach for implicit credibility computation measures the credibility of a
user by taking into account the agreement between the feedback furnished by the user and
the views of the community as a whole. The community average view can be represented
by the reputation value computed from the feedback from all the reporting users. If a
user gives wrong feedback about other users, that is his or her feedback is very different
from the eventual reputation value for computed, its credibility rating is decreased and
its subsequent reports have a reduced impact on the reputation of another user. This
method of computing credibility has an advantage in that it is more scalable and it can
operate in decentralized systems where a complete record of all opinions expressed by
other individuals may not be available due to privacy concerns. However, there is a danger
of “group-think” in such systems. There is strong encouragement for an individual to
agree with the opinion of the group as a whole as disagreements are punished by lowering
the credibility of the individual who disagrees.
5.3 Motivation for Providing Feedback
A closely related issue is how to motivate community members to provide feedback to
others when providing feedback consumes their own resources. In some respects this
problem is the same as that of motivating cooperation between community members as
discussed above. However, there are some important differences. In a designated agent
system, designated agents must use their own resources to store, compute and report rep-
utation values for other members. Most literature assumes that agents will perform this
task because they are “altruistic” or because they too will benefit from a designated agent
system. However, in a large network, there is little incentive for a particular individual
to expend resources to maintain the reputation system. How do we prevent such an in-
dividual from free-riding the reputation system itself? Moreover, from a game theoretic
perspective, not reporting feedback may be advantageous to an agent in a competitive sit-
uation. By reporting feedback to other agents, it is sharing information with them which
if kept to itself may have given it an advantage.
One strategy to encourage truthful reputation reports is to create a side-market for reputa-
tion where accurate reputation reports are rewarded with currency that can be traded for
accurate reports from others [30]. Such a system needs to be structured in such a way that
providing more feedback and providing honest feedback results in more credit. However
this solution suffers from the recursion problem mentioned above as third-order market
would need to be created and so on.
An alternative way to avoid the recursion problem is to incorporate the credibility of an
individual in the reputation system as a separate variable as discussed in the previous
section. If the credibility is computed through direct evidence only and is not shared with
others as in [23] then the recursion problem can be avoided.
An individual with a high credibility will be listened to by other participants in the virtual
community with more attention and can thus be said to have greater influence on the
community. Hence, selfish individuals may adopt a dynamic strategy in which they adjust
their behavior on the basis of the credibility (and thus influence) of the partner they are
about to transact with. Here, an individual will behave honestly with another individual
who has high credibility and will cheat with an individual with low influence. An adverse
report from the low influence individual will carry less weight and not have an adverse
impact on the reputation of the first individual, while the opposite is true of the high
influence individual.
This provides an incentive for individuals to give truthful reputation reports for others.
Accurate reports result in higher influence which in turn would result in a higher likeli-
hood of cooperation by the transaction parters. This incentivization does not come for
free. It depends on two conditions: 1) individuals will behave dynamically, i.e., users
must cheat with a different probability based on the influence of their transaction part-
ners, and 2) credibility information is available globally. When these conditions are not
met, this subtle form of incentivization is absent.
An additional problem introduced when individuals adopt dynamic startegies. A single
reputation value can no longer predict the behavior of an individual at all times as their
behavior will depend on the credibility of their interaction partner. As a result, such
scenarios have not been the subject of much research.
Therefore, there seems to be only one solution in that an individual’s behavior in the main
market and in the secondary reputation market should both influence a unified reputation
value. And since this unified reputation value is public, it incentivizes truthful reporting.
However, the question of how much relative weight to give to the two types of market
transactions remains unresolved. If too much weight is given to the main market there is
not enough disincentive to make false reports. On the other hand, if not enough weight
is given to the main market, an individual can be a truthful reporter but cheat in the main
market without being punished sufficiently.
5.4 Motivation is not a Problem: Dissenting Views
A number of authors do not agree that motivation (of cooperation and of sharing feedback)
is a problem at all. Fehr and Ga¨chter [19] develop a theory of “altruistic punishment”.
They designed an experiment that excluded all explanations for cooperation other than
that of altruistic punishment. They designed a McCabe style investment game [7] where
players could punish their partners if they wished. However, punishing was costly both
to the punisher (1 point) and the punished (3 points). Punishment induced cooperation
from potential non-cooperators thus increasing the benefit to the group as a whole even
though it was costly to the punisher. For this reason punishment was an altruistic act.
They concluded that negative emotions are the cause of altruistic punishment and that
there is a tendency in humans to punish those that deviate from social norms.
Similarly, Gintis et al. [24] argue that behaving in an altruistic fashion sends a signal to
other participants that interacting with that individual is likely to prove beneficial. This
argument cuts at the heart of the game theoretic notion of how rational agents operate.
Rational agent behavior now becomes probabilistic in that an agent may act in an altruistic
fashion in the hope of future reward instead of only interacting when an immediate benefit
is expected. This interpretation also depends on whether the individuals in the system
are humans or are automated agents that do not share the “altruistic” characteristics and
behave in a strictly rational sense.
This has been used as evidence that altruism serves an agent’s self-interest. It also ex-
plains why greedy strategy are outperformed by more altruistic strategies in Axelrod’s
experiment. Hence, there is some theoretical basis to the claim that a virtual community
can be be self-correcting and will exclude bad participants.
5.5 Other Design Issues
A number of other design choices must be made in a reputation system.
Reputation Context : There has been some research on whether reputation is contextual.
It is often assumed that reputation is heavily dependent on context. This point of
view was aptly expressed by Mui et al. [35]
“Reputation is clearly a context-dependent quantity. For example, one’s
reputation as a computer scientist should have no influence on his or her
reputation as cook.”
However, in a contrary argument Gintis et al. [24] suggest that compartmentalizing
reputation too strictly can have a negative effect. Their contention is that altruistic
behavior is motivated in part by a desire to signal that interacting with the individual
in question will be beneficial in other contexts as well. They argue that the notion
of reputation in a real world is far more fuzzy and incorporates generosity as well.
A generous participant is more likely to be honest as well. This gives participants
an incentive to behave in an altruistic fashion in addition to behaving in an honest
fashion.
Transaction Value : A reputation system must also be able to distinguish between small
and large transactions. Buying a pencil online is not the same as buying a car. If
all transactions are rated equally, an individual may exploit the system through a
strategy called milking where they act honestly in a number of small transactions
to build their reputation and then cheat in a large transaction without hurting their
reputation too much. In PeerTrust [46] this problem is solved by incorporating a
transaction context factor that weighs the feedback according to size, importance
and the recency of the transaction.
Interpreting Reputation : Once the reputation of a user (or object in case of recommen-
dation systems) has been computed, it can be used in several ways depending on
the application context. In a file-sharing system [15] a peer may choose the peer
with the highest reputation to download the file from. On Amazon, the recommen-
dation system may prompt one to buy a book that one was not aware of before.
GroupLens [38] helps decide which movie a user decides to watch.
Equally common are applications that demand a Boolean yes/no decision on “Should
! trust " ?”. There are several methods by which this translation from an arbitrary
range of reputation values to a binary value can be achieved. These include 1) using
a deterministic threshold (I will trust you if your reputation value exceeds @ on a
scale of AB ), 2) relative ranking (I will trust you if your reputation is in the top ABDC
of community members), 3) probabilistic thresholds (the probability that I trust you
is a monotonic function on the range of possible trust values) and 4) majority round-
ing (I will trust you if I trust a majority of people with reputation values close to
your reputation).
Another approach [40, 42] is to include information that allows a user to decide
how much faith it should place in the reputation value. On e-Bay this information
is the number of feedbacks a user has received. A user with a high reputation and
a large number of feedbacks is much more trustworthy than one with a low number
of feedbacks.
Benefits of High Reputation : Many reputation systems particularly those proposed for
file-sharing applications [1,15,32] do not consider the consequences of a peer hav-
ing a high reputation. In file-sharing systems the most reputable peer in the network
will be swamped with requests as all peers are going to want to download the re-
sources from it. Hence peers with high reputations are “punished” for their high
reputations by having to expend more of their resources to serve others instead of
being benefited from their reputation. In this scenario the interests of the system are
not aligned with that of individuals and the individual peers have no motivation to
act honestly and thus increase their reputation.
In order to motivate individuals to try and acquire high reputations, there needs to
be a mechanism by which nodes that have a high reputation are rewarded. In a file-
sharing application this could be achieved through preferential access for higher
reputation nodes to resources at other nodes.
Positive vs. Negative Feedback : A reputation system may be based solely on either
positive feedback, negative feedback or a combination of both. The disadvantage
of a negative feedback only system [1] is that each new entrant into the system has
the highest possible reputation. Hence a misbehaving individual may create a new
identity and shed their bad reputations to start afresh. Using only positive feedback,
on the other hand, makes it hard to distinguish between a new user and a dishonest
user. If old users choose not to interact with any users without a minimum level
of positive feedback, a new user may thus find itself frzen out of the group and
interacting only with malicious users.
Identities : A reputation system that allows unlimited creation of new identities is vulner-
able to manipulation [18]. Hence there must be a cost of a new identities. However,
at the same time this cost must not be so large as to discourage newcomers from
joining. Friedman and Resnick argue that in social situations there is inevitably
some form of initiation dues [20]. They also find that while these dues are ineffi-
cient, especially when there are many newcomers to a community, no other strategy
does substantially better in terms of group utility.
6 Some Reputation Systems
We now look at some reputation management algorithms that have been proposed in re-
cent years.
6.1 Complaints-Based Trust
One of the first reputation management algorithms for the peer-to-peer systems was pro-
posed by Aberer and Despotovic in [1]. This system is based solely on negative feedback
given by peers when they are not satisfied by the files received from another peer. The
system works on the assumption that a low probability of cheating in a community makes
it harder to hide malicious behavior.
Let 1 denote the set of all peers in the network and E be the behavioral data consisting
of trust observations F
GIHKJ
 made by a peer
GML
1 when it interacts with a peer
JNL
1 .
We can assess the behavioral data of a specific peer
J
based on the set
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In this manner, the behavior of a peer takes into account not only all reports made about
J
but also all reports made by
J
. In a decentralized system a peer
G
does not have access to
the global data E
SJ
 and E . Hence it relies on direct evidence as well as indirect evidence
from a limited number of witnesses W
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However, the witness W itself may be malicious and give false evidence. Aberer and
Despotovic assume that peers only lie to cover their own bad behavior. If peer
J
is mali-
cious and cheats peer
G
,
G
will file a complaint against it. If
J
also files a complaint against
G
at the same time it could be difficult to find out who is the malicious peer. However,
if
J
keeps acting maliciously it will become easy to detect it since there will be a lot of
complaints filed from peer W about a set of good peers and a lot of complaints filed from
these good peers all about peer
J
. Based on this, the reputation of
J
can be calculated as:
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Aberer and Despotovic proposed a decentralized storage system called P-Grid to store
reputation information. Each peer
J
can file a complaint about another peer
G
at any time
as follows:
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where
r
 and
r

are two arbitrary agents. Insertions are made on the keys of both
J
and
G
since the system stores complaints both by and about a given peer.
Assuming that an agent is malicious with probability { and that an error rate of | is
tolerable, then a peer
J
will need to receive W replicas of the same data satisfying {Z}~:|
to ensure that the error rate is not exceeded. If a simple majority rule is employed, the
total number of queries for each trust verification will never exceed < W 8A .
A peer
J
making p queries will obtain a set
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where  is the number of different witnesses found,
r
 is the identifier of the ! -th witness,
 is the frequency with which witness
r
 is found and p 
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are the complaints about
G
and filed by
G
respectively as reported by witness
r
 . Dif-
ferent witnesses are found with different frequencies and the ones which are found less
frequently have probably been found less frequently also when complaints were filed. So
it is necessary to normalize kWv
G
 and k(
G
 using frequency l in this way:4
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4Note that the equation below corrects the one presented in the original paper
Each peer
J
can keep a statistics of the average number of complaints filed ( k( ) and
received ( ktW ) and can determine if a peer
G
is trustworthy basing on the information
returned from an agent ! using this algorithm:
Algorithm 1: Trust Assessment Using Complaints
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then return 1; else return -1.
This algorithm assumes that if the total number of complaints received exceeds the aver-
age number of complaints by a large amount, the agent must be malicious.
6.2 EigenTrust
Kamvar et al. [32] presented a distributed algorithm for the computation of the trust values
of all peers in the network. Their algorithm is inspired by the PageRank algorithm used by
Google and assumes that trust is transitive. A user weighs the trust ratings it receives from
other users by the trust it places in the reporting users themselves. Global trust values are
then computed in a distributed fashion by updating the trust vector at each peer using the
trust vectors of neighboring peers. They show that trust values asymptotically approach
the eigenvalue of the trust matrix, conditional on the presence of pre-trusted users that are
always trusted.
A peer ! may rate each transaction with peer " as positive ( F W

!
H
"
¨
A ) or negative
( F W

!
H
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©

A ).The local trust value at ! for " can then be computed by summing the
ratings of individual transactions:
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Local trust values are normalized as follows:
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to keep them between B and A .
In order to aggregate normalized local trust values, trust values furnished by acquain-
tances are weighted by the trust a peer has in the acquaintances themselves:
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where F 
%
is the trust a peer ! places in peer
s
based on the opinion of its acquaintances.
If we define 
¯
F
 to be the vector containing the values F 
%
and ? to be the matrix containing
the values kt

, we get ° F  ?~±
°
kt . The preceding expression only takes into account
opinions of a peer’s acquaintances. In order to get a wider view a peer may ask its friends’
friends and so on:
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Kamvar et al. show that if o is large, peer ! can have a complete view of the network
and the trust vector
°
F
 will converge to the same vector for every peer ! (the left principal
eigenvector of ? ), conditional on ? being irreducible and aperiodic.
They further add three practical issues to this simple algorithm. If there are peers that can
be trusted a priori the algorithm can be modified to take advantage of this. They define
J
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
² ³m² (where 1 is the set containing the pre-trusted peers) if ! is a pre-trusted peer, and B
otherwise. In presence of malicious peers, using an initial trust vector of
°
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instead of if
replace
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q generally ensures faster convergence. If a peer ! has never had any interaction
with other peers, instead of being left undefined, k(

can be defined as:
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In order to prevent malicious collectives from subverting the system, Kamvar et al. further
modify the trust vector to:
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where
r
is some constant less than A . This ensures that at each iteration some of the trust
must be placed in the set of pre-trusted peers thus reducing the impact of the malicious
collective.
Hence, given Ä  the set of peers which have downloaded files from peer ! and E  the
set of peers from which peer ! has downloaded files, each peer ! executes the following
algorithm:
Algorithm 2: Distributed EigenTrust
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Each peer thus obtains the same global trust value matrix for all other peers in the network.
Kamvar et al. further describe a DHT-based solution to anonymously store multiple copies
of the trust value for a given peer at several score managers. This eliminates the problem
caused by malicious peers reporting false trust values for themselves to other peers in
order to subvert the system.
6.3 PeerTrust
In PeerTrust [46], Xiong and Liu define five factors used to compute the trustworthiness
of a peer. These are: 1) feedback obtained from other peers, 2) scope of feedback such
as number of transactions, 3) credibility of feedback source, 4) transaction context factor
to differentiate between mission-critical and non-critical transactions and 5) community
context factor for addressing community related characteristics and vulnerabilities.
Given a recent time window, let .
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where Ò and × are weight factors.
In their experimental study, Xiong and Liu turn off the transaction context factor and
the community context factor and use two credibility metrics. The first is based on the
trust value of the reporting peer (similar to EigenTrust) while the second is based on the
similarity between the reporting peer and the recipient of the trust information. They
further propose using a PKI-based scheme and data replication to increase the security
and reliability of their system.
6.4 ROCQ
Garg et al. [22, 23] proposed a scheme that combines local opinion, credibility of the
reporter and the quality of feedback to compute the reputation of a peer in the system. In
their scheme direct evidence in the form of local opinion is reported to score managers
which are chosen using distributed hash tables.
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where ?

 is the credibility of user ! according to user Ø , Ù 

is ! ’s average opinion of
" and
Ü
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is the associated quality value reported by ! .
The quality value of an opinion depends on the number of transactions on which the
opinion is based and the consistency with which the transaction partner has acted. Thus
an opinion is of greater quality when the number of observations on which it is based
is larger and when the interactions have been consistent (resulting in a smaller variance).
When the number of observations is high but they do not agree with each other, the quality
value is lower.
The credibility of a user is based on direct evidence only and is not shared with other
users. This prevents the recursion problem of calculating the third-order reputation and
so on. The credibility is based upon the agreement of the reported opinion with the group
consensus as reflected in the reputation value and is updated after every report received.
The precise formula for adjusting the credibility of user ! by user Ø is:
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where ? %

 is the credibility of user ! after
s
reports to user Ø , Ù 

is the opinion being
currently reported by user ! ,
Ü


is the associated quality value, 0


is the aggregated
reputation value that user Ø computed for " and p


is the standard deviation of all the
reported opinions about user " . In this way, if a reporting user is malicious, its credibility
rating is gradually reduced since its opinion does not match that of the community as a
whole.
The authors also propose combining both direct and indirect evidence to create reputation.
They proposed a threshold number of interactions between two users below which users
will rely on the global reputation of their prospective partner and above which they would
rely on first hand evidence only. This eliminates the problem of sparsity of data while at
the same time allowing for reputation to be tailored according to personal experience.
6.5 Propagation of Trust and Distrust
A number of mathematical approaches to propagating trust [25,41] and distrust [27] have
been proposed. In particular, Guha et al. gave a number of models of atomic (single-step)
propagation. Let E be a belief matrix whose !ä"eÍSÎ element signifies ! ’s belief in " . E
can be composed of either the trust matrix ( / 

is ! ’s trust in " ) or both the trust and the
distrust ( ð 

is ! ’s distrust in " ) matrices (say E 


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). Then, atomic propagation
of trust takes place by: 1) direct propagation (matrix operator5: B) : assumes that trust
is transitive so if ! trusts " and " trusts
s
then we can infer that ! trusts
s
, 2) co-citation
( E ± E ): if both ! and " trust
s
and if ! trusts
¿
, then " also trusts
¿
, 3) transpose trust ( E ± ):
assumes that trust is reexive so that if ! trusts " then trusting " should imply trusting ! ,
and 4) trust coupling ( E[E ± ): if ! and " trust
s
, then trusting ! should also imply trusting
" . They then go on to propagate trust using a combined matrix that gives weights to the
four propagation schemes:
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Thus, applying the atomic propagations a fixed number of times, new beliefs can be com-
puted. In a limited set of experiments, they study the prediction performance of their
algorithm on real data and find that the best performance comes with one-step propaga-
tion of distrust while trust can be propagated repeatedly.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
The area of reputation systems remains fertile for future research. Initial research in this
area has focused on applying lessons from diverse fields such as evolutionary biology and
game theory to computer science. In particular game-theoretic models such as the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma were adapted to virtual communities. However this analysis is limited
by not considering the presence of irrational (malicious) players in the community.
Simultaneously, several new reputation schemes have been proposed. These schemes
typically propose a new trust model followed by experimental simulation. However it is
difficult to compare the schemes side-by-side as each scheme makes its own assumptions
about the interaction model, modes of maliciousness and levels of collusion among mali-
cious peers, not to mention widely varying experimental parameters such as the number
of peers in the system and the proportion of malicious peers.
5The matrix operator when applied to a belief matrix would yield a new matrix indicating inferred trust.
More recently, there has been some work on analyzing systems in the presence of mali-
cious peers. For instance, Mundinger and Le Boudec [36] analyze the robustness of their
reputation system in the presence of liars and try to find the critical phase transition point
where liars start impacting the system.
As the interest in virtual communities, particularly self-organizing communities grows,
we are likely to see a lot more research on the various facets of this topic.
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